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Abstract 
 
 
Analysing disputes between the US and the EU under GATT and the WTO respectively, the 
paper demonstrates that the judicialization (or legalization) of international dispute settlement 
procedures can contribute to states’ compliance with these dispute settlement mechanisms. 
The paper compares four sets of pairwise similar disputes with US had with the EU: the so-
called Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISC) case (which arose under GATT) 
and the Foreign Sales Corporations case (which was settled through WTO procedures), the 
Steel case (GATT) and the Patents case (WTO), the two Hormones cases under GATT and 
the WTO respectively, and the Citrus case (GATT) and the Bananas case (WTO). In each of 
the four comparisons the US acted more in accordance with the judicial WTO dispute 
settlement procedures than with the diplomatic GATT procedures. We can therefore say that 
contrary to realist assumptions, the judicialization of dispute settlement procedures can 
contribute to their effectiveness. However, contrary to idealist assumptions the effectiveness 
of international dispute settlement procedures does not automatically follow from their 
judicialization. Yet, as assumed by institutionalists, judicialized dispute settlement procedures 
are better than diplomatic dispute settlement mechanisms in sustaining states’ compliance 
with these procedures precisely because of their normative and strategic effects. 
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Introduction1 
 
 
The rule of law is one of the crucial dimensions of modern statehood. Yet, until recently even 
OECD states were only internally bound by domestic law, while externally state sovereignty 
implied that they were not equally bound by international law. While internally the judiciary 
provides the institutional safeguard that urges state actors to comply with domestic legal 
obligations, until recently there was no parallel international judiciary to ensure that state 
actors complied with their external legal obligations. There are indications today, however, 
that due to the emergence of issue area-specific international judiciaries the domestic rule of 
law is increasingly complemented by an international rule of law.2  
 
In fact, judicialized procedures designed to adjudicate whether state actors comply with their 
international commitments are on the rise.3 Recently, an International Criminal Court was 
created to pass sentence on war crimes. The authority of the European Court of Justice as 
well as the European Court of Human Rights was strengthened. An International Tribunal for 
the Law of Sea has been established. Many international environmental regimes, such as the 
ozone regime and the climate regime, now dispose of quasi-judicial non-compliance 
procedures. And last but not least, with the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
the diplomatic dispute settlement procedures of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) have been replaced by a judicial dispute settlement system.4 
 
The rise of judicial dispute settlement procedures might be seen as one indication of an 
emerging international rule of law. At least, traditional idealists always claimed that the 
judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures would lead almost automatically 
to an international rule of law. In contrast to diplomatic dispute settlement mechanisms, they 
argued, judicialized dispute settlement procedures would ensure both compliance with 
international law and comparable treatment of comparable breaches of international law.5 
Others, however, argued that international dispute settlement procedures would not ensure 
an international rule of law. For these so-called realists, it was not a matter of the 
judicialization of dispute settlement procedures whether states comply with international law 
and whether comparable breaches of international law are given comparable treatment. They 
maintained that irrespective of judicial or diplomatic dispute settlement procedures powerful 
states can and will always act as they please, while less powerful states have to suffer what 
they must.6 
                                                 
1 This paper draws heavily on research done in the project ‘Judicialization of International Dispute 
Settlement’ which is part of the Bremen Research Centre ‘Transformations of the State’ (TranState) 
funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Therefore my first thanks go to Achim 
Helmedach, Aletta Mondré, and Gerald Neubauer who are part of the project’s research team. I would 
also like to thank Karen Alter, Ken Abbott, Klaus Dingwerth, Monika Heupel, Jürgen Neyer and Jonas 
Tallberg for their most helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Thanks go also to the 
participants of the 2004 Luncheon Seminar of the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University 
Institute in Florence/Italy as well as the participants of the 2004 Luncheon Seminar of the Center for 
European Studies at Harvard University in Cambridge/USA.  
2 For a discussion on the international rule of law see Watts 2000, Watts 1993, Tamanaha 2004, 
Brownlie 1998. 
3 Romano 1999. 
4 Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter 2000, Zangl and Zürn 2004a,b. 
5 Clark and Sohn 1966. 
6 Morgenthau 1948. 
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Today, however, the debate between idealists and realists has lost ground; institutionalists 
now set the tone.7 Idealist positions were clearly undermined by the fact that the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), with its judicialized dispute settlement procedure, has hardly 
transformed international dispute settlement practices. Since the ICJ has rarely been invoked 
and its rulings often ignored, it could hardly be said to have institutionalized an international 
rule of law. But realist assumptions were also weakened by the fact that the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ), marked by a heavily judicialized procedure of dispute settlement, has 
transformed European dispute settlement practice. The ECJ has regularly been invoked and 
its rulings usually followed, thereby establishing an international rule of law in Europe.8 For 
institutionalists, however, it remains an empirical question whether – and if so where and 
when – the judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures leads to a 
corresponding practice of judicialized dispute settlement. 9  Hence, from an institutionalist 
point of view, the judicialization of the practice of international dispute settlement is neither 
considered impossible nor is it seen as an automatism of the judicialization of dispute 
settlement procedures. Most institutionalists, be they of a more rationalist or of a more 
constructivist orientation, would nevertheless subscribe to the hypothesis that, ceteris 
paribus – at least under today’s circumstances in the OECD world –, the judicialization of 
dispute settlement procedures sustains the judicialization of international dispute settlement 
practice.10  
 
Assuming that the judicialization of dispute settlement is one important aspect for the 
emergence of an international rule of law, I aim to evaluate this institutionalist hypothesis and 
trace the processes due to which judicial dispute settlement procedures have a more 
pronounced impact on states’ dispute settlement behaviour that diplomatic dispute 
settlement proceedings. To do so, I will compare US dispute settlement behaviour in the 
context of the judicial WTO dispute settlement procedures with its behaviour in similar 
disputes under the diplomatic dispute settlement system of GATT. In a first step I elaborate 
on the institutionalist hypothesis by indicating why judicial dispute settlement procedures 
might be better equipped to control states’ dispute settlement than diplomatic dispute 
settlement mechanisms. In a second step I briefly describe the judicialization of GATT/WTO 
dispute settlement procedures that has been taken place over the past two decades. In a 
third step I then conduct the above mentioned comparison of US dispute settlement 
behaviour under the GATT and WTO respectively. The comparison reveals that the US was 
more willing to act according to the agreed WTO procedures than it was prepared to comply 
with GATT proceedings. Against the background of alternative explanations, the paper 
                                                 
7 For an overview of institutionalism in International Relations see among others Hasenclever, Mayer 
and Rittberger 1997, Rittberger, Hasenclever and Mayer 2000, Keohane 1989.  
8 Alter 2001. 
9 In this paper I distinguish the terms "judicialization" and "judicialized": Judicialization is used to 
describe processes of institutional change through which a given dispute settlement procedure 
becomes more judicialized. Judicialized, by contrast, describes the state of an institution that has 
reached a certain threshold.  
10 See for instance Stone Sweet 1996, Stone Sweet 2000, Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1997, Helfer and 
Slaughter 1998, Weiler 1999, McCall Smith 2000, Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter 2000, Alter 
2001, Alter 2006, Zürn and Joerges 2005, Zangl and Zürn 2004a,b, Zürn and Joerges 2005, Zürn 
2005. For an empirical critique of the institutionalist hypothesis see Posner and Yoo 2005. For a 
criticism of the critique see Helfer and Slaughter 2005. 
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concludes with an overall evaluation of the hypothesis and some general remarks on the 
emergence of an international rule of law.  
 
 
 
1. The Institutionalist Hypothesis 
 
 
The hypothesis that the judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures 
supports corresponding practices of judicialized dispute settlement rests on the institutionalist 
assumption that, the effects of international institutions depend – among other things – on 
their institutional design. Accordingly, in terms of design, institutions with a judicial DSP such 
as the European human rights regime which tries through the European Court of Human 
Rights to ensure an impartial treatment of alleged breaches of international law can be 
distinguished from institutions with diplomatic DSPs such as the UN Human Rights Council 
which cannot be seen as institutional attempts to ensure the comparable treatment of 
comparable breaches of international law. The judicialization of a given DSP, hence, entails 
that it moves in terms of its design on a gradual scale from the pole of a purely diplomatic 
DSP towards the pole of a judicial DSP. In this view, judicialization can be assessed on the 
basis of four criteria international DSPs might meet to varying degrees:11 
 
(1) Political Independence: The political independence of international DSP is a criterion of 
the utmost importance for an impartial treatment of breaches of international law. 12 
Concentrating on the composition of the relevant dispute settlement bodies four grades of 
independence can be distinguished: Bodies such as the old GATT working parties in which 
representatives of the disputing states themselves are deciding on the dispute at hand are 
the least independent. Somewhat more independent are bodies such as the UN security 
council in which states that are (usually) not subject to the dispute deliver a decision. They 
are, however, less independent than bodies such as some ILO committees composed of 
experts acting in their individual capacities. However, only a standing body of judges such as 
the International Court of Justice can be considered truly independent.  
 
(2) Legal Mandate: Irrespective of its independence the mandate of an international DSP has 
to be regarded as an important criteron of an impartial treatment of breaches of international 
law. Considering whether the mandate is rather political or rather legal four grades can be 
distinguished: If, as in the case of the UN Security Council for instance, the decision ensuing 
from the DSP is allowed to be based on mainly political considerations rather than legal 
reasoning the mandate can hardly be seen as legal. Decsions of a somewhat more 
judicialized DSP draw on legal arguments while their rulings are not legally binding. Here one 
can further distingusigh between those based un legally binding procedures such as the ICJ 
when giving advisory opinions and those where the procedures themselves have no legally 
binding force, which is the case under CITES. But only procedures that feature binding rules 
of due process and are authorized to take legally binding decisions can be considered to 
                                                 
11 For a set of criteria to describe processes of judicialization see Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1997, Helfer 
and Slaughter 1998, Helmedach et al. 2006, McCall Smith 2000, Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter 
2000, Zangl 2001, Zangl and Zürn 2004a, b. 
12 Keohane et al. 2000: 459-462, Helfer, Slaughter 1997: 353-355 
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have a fully judicialized mandate, as for instance is the case with the European Court of 
Human Rights.  
 
(3) Authority to decide: The authority of the relevant DSP to make decisions is another, 
important criterion for a comparable treatment of comparable breaches of international law.13 
Considering the disputing parties ability to block the proceedings of an international DSP four 
grades are to be distinguished: As in the old GATT, the DSP’s authority to decide remains 
very restricted when the states involved in a dispute can block both the initiation of the 
procedures as well as the adpoption of decisions made within these procedures. The 
decision making authority of a DSP also remains quite restricted when disputing states can 
block either the initiation of the relevant procedure or their rulings as is, for instance, the case 
with the International Court of Justice. Where, as in ILO, the decisions of DSPs can only be 
blocked by a collective of states, rather than by the states involved in a dispute, the authority 
to decide can be described as quasi-compulsory. True compulsory decicion making 
authority, however, requires that rulings such as those of the European Court of Human 
Rights may not be blocked either by individual states or by a collective of states.  
 
(4) Sanctions: The authority to decide on sanctions in cases where states do not comply with 
rulings made within international DSP can be regarded as another relevant criterion for the 
comparable treatment of comparable breaches of international law.14 Four grades are to be 
distinguished: The authority to sanction does not exist if the DSP does not regulate sanctions 
at all, as in the case of the ILO, for example. Their authority to sanction is, however, also 
quite limited when complaining states that are willing to employ sanctions against non 
compliant defendant states need, as in the old GATT system, the authorization of the 
respective DSP, but such authorization can be blocked by the affected state. If, as in the 
WTO, such an option to block the authorization of sanctions does not exist, the authority to 
sanctions is substantively stronger. However,a fully developed authority to sanction requires 
the DSP’s rights to mandate sanctions, as is the case with the UN Security Council.  
 
Given that the four criteria allow assessing – on the basis of their respective grades –the 
judicialization of any international DSP, it should be able to evaluate the institutionalist 
hypothesis. The hypothesis rests on the institutionalist assumption that, depending on their 
institutional design, international institutions – and by implication their dispute settlement 
procedures – can have multiple effects.15 Despite the fact that institutionalists of a more 
rational16 and a more constructivist17 orientation focus on different effects, they agree that 
institutions in general and their dispute settlement procedures more specifically can have 
normative and strategic effects which can operate either enabling or constraining. 
Accordingly, four major effects of international institutions can be distinguished that might, in 
principle, be supported by the judicialization of their dispute settlement procedures: 
                                                 
13 Morgenthau 1948, McCall 2000: 139-140 
14 Morgenthau 1948, Zangl/Zürn 2004 
15 For the impact the design of international institutions might have on their effectiveness see among 
others Haas, Keohane and Levy (eds.) 1993, Mitchell 1994, Chayes and Chayes 1995, Underdal 
1998, Victor, Raustiala and Skolnikoff 1998, Wettestad 1999, Young 1999, Brown Weiss and 
Jacobson 1998, Miles, Underdal and Carlin 2001, Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001, Tallberg 2002. 
16 See, for instance, Helmedach et al. 2006, Keohane 1984, 1989, Zangl and Zürn 2004: 25-26, Zürn 
1992, Martin 1992 and Scharpf 1997.  
17 See among others Wendt 1992, Wendt 1999, Hurrell 1993, Katzenstein 1996, Risse 2000, Finnemore 
1996, Klotz 1995, Müller 1994, Checkel 2001. 
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Table 1: Effects of International Institutions  
 
 Constraining Effect  Enabling Effect  
Normative  
Effect  
States are constrained by their own 
normative commitment to the 
institution 
Institutions can help states to 
undermine the reputation of non-
compliant states through shaming 
Strategic 
Effect  
States are constrained by their own 
interest in the institution’s credibility 
Institutions can help states to 
increase the costs of other states’ 
non-compliance by authorizing 
sanctions 
 
 
• International institutions and their dispute settlement procedures can have an effect 
because states feel normatively compelled to respect them. Thus, international dispute 
settlement procedures can rely on a normative compliance pull of their own.18 They might be 
internalized by states to the degree that following them becomes an aim in itself. Hence, 
disregarding or manipulating them is not even taken into consideration; following the 
procedures is then taken for granted.19  
• International institutions and their dispute settlement procedures might be effective 
because disregarding them can, through shaming, undermine a state’s reputation as a 
reliable member of the international community. A bad reputation may not only inhibit any 
future cooperation with that state within the same institution20; it may even undermine its 
recognition as an equal member of the international community. Hence, states are prepared 
to follow international dispute settlement procedures to prevent losing their status as an 
equal member of the international community.21  
• International institutions and their dispute settlement procedures might have an impact 
because states are interested in their credibility. Especially when states consider the 
institution to be serving their interests they may be willing to follow its dispute settlement 
procedures. They will understand that disregarding these procedures can undermine the 
institution’s credibility. This in turn, might lead to the breakdown of the dispute settlement 
procedures that support an institution in whose effectiveness they are interested. Hence, 
states follow agreed dispute settlement procedures because they shy away from the 
consequences of disregarding behaviour for the institution as such.22  
• The influence of international institutions and their dispute settlement procedures may 
also stem from their authority to impose sanctions against those states found to be violating 
their international commitments.23 By authorizing sanctions international institutions and their 
dispute settlement procedures might coordinate the sanctions of affected states, thereby 
making them more effective. 24  Moreover, authorized sanctions might be more effective 
because, as opposed to non-authorized sanctions, states that incur these sanctions can 
                                                 
18 Franck 1990. 
19 Koh 1997. 
20 Keohane 1984. 
21 Hurrell 1993, Chayes and Chayes 1995. 
22 Zürn 2005, Cronin 2001. 
23 Underdal 1998. 
24 Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 1996, Keohane 1984, Axelrod and Keohane 1986. 
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hardly justify any retaliation against sanctioning states. Hence, they cannot deter others from 
applying sanctions against their non-compliant behaviour.25  
 
Building on these effects, the institutionalist hypothesis claims that judicialized DSPs are 
better in sustaining states’ compliance with these DSPs than diplomatic DSPs precisely 
because they are better at activating their normative and strategic, their constraining and 
enabling effects. But why should, according to institutionalist thinking, judicial DSPs be better 
in activating these effects than diplomatic DSPs? Institutionalists of a more constructivist 
orientation and institutionalists of a more rationalist orientation may point at two reasons: 
 
(1) Institutionalists of a more constructivist orientation may argue that judicial DSPs may be 
perceived as being more legitimate than diplomatic DSPs, because they institutionalize the 
principle of an impartial treatment of alleged breaches of international law to a larger degree. 
This can, according to constructivist institutionalism support the normative effects 
international DSP may have: on the one hand the perceived legitimacy of DSPs may support 
the feeling of states and societies to be normatively commitment to respect these 
procedures, because disregarding them cannot be justified by pointing at a lack of their 
legitimacy; and on the other hand the perceived legitimacy of DSPs may also drive the 
feeling of states and societies that any breach of the respective procedures will undermine 
their reputation as law abiding members of the international community, because it provokes 
more normative insurrection than disregarding a DSP that is considered to be less legitimate.  
 
(2) Institutionalist of a rationalist orientation can argue that judicial DSPs are generally 
perceived to be more reliable than diplomatic DSPs, because they are better equipped to 
treat breaches of international law in an effective way. This can, according to rational 
institutionalism support the strategic effects international DSP may have: on the one hand 
the perceived reliability of international DSPs may support the feeling of states and societies 
that following these procedures is in their own interest in order to preserve the DSP’s 
credibility; on the other hand the perceived reliability of international DSPs may drive the 
feeling that threats of binding convictions and of authorized sanctions are credible. This can 
enhance the incentive to follow the procedures to deal with alleged breaches of international 
law by other states while at the same time enhancing incentives to comply with these 
procedures when accused by others to violate international law. 
 
To evaluate the institutionalist hypothesis that due to these reasons judicial DSPs are better 
able to activate the normative and strategic effects of international institutions than diplomatic 
DSPs, four types of behaviour states may apply in their attempts to settle disputes are to be 
distinguished. Each type of behaviour can be displayed in each of the four phases any 
dispute might pass through, i.e. the complaints, adjudication, implementation, and the 
enforcement phase: (1) States may strictly follow the relevant procedures and show 
willingness to settle disputes as envisaged by the relevant dispute settlement procedure. (2) 
States may avoid the application of the relevant dispute settlement procedures and seek a 
negotiated settlement, but without violating the provisions of the procedures. (3) States may 
choose to use the relevant dispute settlement procedures but at the same time seek to 
                                                 
25 Zangl 2006. 
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manipulate their operation by questionable means. (4) States may also choose to disregard 
the relevant DSP by violating agreed dispute settlement provisions.  
 
The institutionalist hypothesis is supported if it can be demonstrated that due to the reasons 
given above the judicialization of international DSPs dispute settlement behaviour 
disregarding or manipulating the procedures becomes less and less diffused while following 
the procedures to settle disputes is becoming more common.26 
 
 
 
2. The Judicialization of Dispute Settlement Procedures under GATT/ WTO 
 
 
To evaluate the institutionalist hypothesis, and the four effects it builds on, I have chosen the 
GATT/WTO dispute settlement system, because it has undergone a remarkable process of 
judicialization over the past two decades, thus allowing a comparison of states’ actual 
dispute settlement behaviour under the judicialized WTO dispute settlement system and the 
diplomatic dispute settlement mechanism of GATT within the same issue area thereby 
facilitating to control for potentially confounding variables.27 
 
In terms of political independence, the process of judicialization of the GATT/WTO dispute 
settlement procedures is quite manifest.28 The political independence of dispute settlement 
procedures under GATT was rather restricted.29 During the 1980s and early 1990s so-called 
panels made up of three or five panelists were assigned the task of deciding in so-called 
reports whether states had violated their GATT obligations. Although the panelists acted in 
their individual capacities, the fact that the disputing states had to agree on the panelists on a 
case-by-case basis militated against their independence, as did the fact that they mostly 
chose state representatives rather than independent legal experts. 30  During the 1990s, 
however, after the WTO was established, the political independence of the dispute 
settlement procedure was consolidated. While the composition of the panels did not change, 
a remarkably independent Appellate Body was established to revise panel reports in appeal 
cases, and thereby diffused its independence across the entire dispute settlement system. 
Unlike the panels, the Appellate Body is composed of independent legal experts, i.e. judges, 
acting in their individual capacities. Moreover, rather than being selected by the disputing 
states, the seven judges of the Appellate Body are now elected to deal with all disputes that 
arise during their four-year term.31 
 
                                                 
26 Helmedach et al. 2006, Zangl 2006. 
27 The effects of the judicialization of GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have become the 
subject of intensive debate. See, for instance, Busch and Reinhardt 2002, Busch and Reinhardt 
2003a, Busch and Reinhardt 2003b, Busch, Raciborski and Reinhardt 2005, Iida 2004, Zangl 2001, 
Zangl 2006, Zürn 2005.  
28 For criteria to distinguish different degrees of political independence of dispute settlement procedures 
see Helmedach et al. 2006, Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter 2000, Helfer and Slaughter 1998: 353-
355, Zangl and Zürn 2004a: 25-26. 
29 Jackson 2004, Petersmann 1997. 
30 Jackson 2004. 
31 Petersmann 1997: 177-198, Stone Sweet 1997. 
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The GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures’ judicialization is also characterized by an 
increasingly legal mandate.32 Through the early 1980s the task of GATT panels was mainly 
to stipulate in their panel reports solutions the disputing parties could agree on. Hence, panel 
reports were the result of political negotiations and mediation rather than of legal reasoning. 
This was only changed with the WTO dispute settlement procedures. Under the WTO 
procedures panels are forced to base their reports on legal reasoning, because reports that 
rather followed political considerations run the risk of being modified by the Appellate Body 
which had the task of reviewing panel reports in appeal cases.  
 
The GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures’ judicialization is also indicated by their 
increasing authority to decide.33 Through the early 1980s, the establishment of a panel to 
adjudicate in a dispute required a consensual GATT Council decision.34 It was thus even 
possible for the defendant state to block the establishment of a panel. This changed in the 
late 1980s, however, when complainants were given the right to have their allegations heard 
by a panel.35 Yet, the adoption of panel reports still required the consensus of the GATT 
Council. Hence, defendants could still block any decision made against them.36 This changed 
in the mid-1990s when the WTO came into existence. The newly established Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB), which was given the dispute settlement tasks of the old GATT 
Council, almost automatically approves the establishment of panels as required, as well as 
panel and Appellate Body reports. It may block panel reports and Appellate Body rulings only 
by consensus. Thus, since defendants can no longer block the procedure, the DSB can now 
exercise compulsory jurisdiction.37 
 
Another aspect of the judicialization of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system is their 
growing authority to sanction.38 Under GATT, decisions to authorize sanctions required the 
consensus of the GATT Council. They could therefore even be blocked by defendants whose 
non-compliance was criticized by an adopted panel report. 39  Under the WTO dispute 
settlement procedures, by contrast, decisions to authorize aggrieved states to employ 
sanctions can be made without the consent of the defendant state. If a defendant does not 
comply with a WTO ruling – and is not prepared to offer adequate compensation – the 
complainant can request the Dispute Settlement Body to authorize sanctions. This 
authorization is then automatically granted, unless the DSB unanimously decides otherwise. 
The defendant can no longer block the sanctions, and merely has the right to invoke the 
original dispute settlement panel to decide on the amount of sanctions. 
 
In sum, the degree of judicialization of the dispute settlement procedures under the 
GATT/WTO trade regime has been remarkably enhanced.  
                                                 
32 Hudec 1998, Jackson 2004, Waincymer 2002:75 
33 For a discussion of criteria to distinguish different degrees of “compulsory jurisdiction” of dispute 
settlement procedures see Helmedach et al. 2006, McCall Smith 2000: 139-140, Zangl and Zürn 
2004a: 27. 
34 Hudec 1993. 
35 Petersmann 1997: 66-91. 
36 Jackson 2004, Hudec 1993. 
37 Jackson 1997: 107-137, Stone Sweet 1997, Petersmann 1997: 177-198. 
38 For criteria to differentiate between different degrees of authority to sanction different dispute 
settlement procedures might have, see for instance Helmedach et al. 2006, Morgenthau 1948, 
Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1997, Zangl and Zürn 2004a: 28-32. 
39 Jackson 2004. 
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3. The Judicialization of US Dispute Settlement Behaviour under GATT/ WTO 
 
 
To evaluate the institutionalist hypothesis I will investigate US dispute settlement behaviour 
in pairwise similar disputes it had with the EU/EC under the GATT and WTO dispute 
settlement systems respectively. I will compare US behaviour in the so-called DISC and FSC 
case, the Patent and Steel case, the first and the second Hormones case, and finally the 
Citrus and Bananas case. The reasons for this particular choice are as follows. First, the 
focus on the US was chosen because if the judicialization of GATT/WTO dispute settlement 
procedures can impact the behaviour of the most powerful state one can assume that it will 
have similar effects on the behaviour of less powerful states too (hard case design). Second, 
the focus on disputes with the EU was chosen to rule out the possibility that differences in 
US behaviour under the WTO and GATT dispute settlement systems are due to differences 
pertaining to the party with which it had the dispute (similar case design). Third, pairwise 
similar disputes were selected to keep the matter of dispute constant. This helps to rule out 
the possibility that differences in behaviour were caused by differences in the matter of the 
disputes (most similar case design). Fourth, I selected not only disputes in which the EU 
complained under GATT/WTO law about US non-compliance, but also disputes in which the 
US itself complained about EU non-compliance with GATT/WTO law. This was imperative in 
order to get an adequate picture of US dispute settlement behaviour, because both as 
complainant and as defendant it may chose to comply with the law or to take the law into its 
own hands. 
 
 
3.1 Comparing the DISC and the FSC Cases  
 
For the purposes of most similar case design the so-called DISC and FSC cases can be 
considered ideal for evaluating the institutionalist hypothesis. While settled under the GATT 
and WTO dispute settlement procedures respectively, they were most similar because both 
cases concerned EU/EC allegations that the US government provided US companies with 
export subsidies through tax preferences for so-called Domestic International Sales 
Corporations (DISCs) and Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) respectively. 
 
 
The DISC Case 
The DISC case between the US and the EU (then the EC) first emerged in 1971, when the 
US administration announced preferential tax treatment for DISCs. 40  DISCs were 
subsidiaries of American companies that, on paper, managed the export business for their 
parent company.41 The US claimed that preferential treatment for DISCs was compatible with 
GATT, because it was meant to offset the competitive disadvantage American export 
companies suffered due to the fundamental differences between the American tax system’s 
principle of global taxation, and the principle of territorial taxation of most European tax 
systems. 42  The EU, however, complained that the preferential tax treatment for DISCs 
                                                 
40 Parent 1989: 93-101, Hufbauer 2002: 1-3. 
41 Parent 1989: 39-44. 
42 Hudec 1993: 59-62. 
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constituted an export subsidy that was illegal under GATT because it provided export-
specific tax exemptions.43  
 
From early on in the complaints phase the US tried to avoid the GATT dispute settlement 
procedures being invoked by the EU. 44  The Nixon administration considered the GATT 
regulations too unspecific for any decision to be made under GATT. The US saw the dispute 
as a political, rather than a legal issue and it was therefore only prepared to seek a 
negotiated settlement. To force the EU to accept negotiations the US announced that if it 
insisted on dispute settlement under GATT, it would initiate GATT proceedings against the 
tax laws of various EU countries.45 Indeed, when the EU requested consultations under 
GATT, the US, in a retaliatory move, demanded consultations over the tax regulations of 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands.46 
 
As the consultations failed, the DISC case, in May 1973, entered the adjudication phase.47 
Now strictly following the dispute settlement procedures, both the EU and the US requested 
GATT panels and abstained from blocking their establishment.48 Therefore, by July 1973 the 
GATT Council was able to agree on four panels to deal with the American and the three 
European tax systems. Due to procedural conflicts between the US and the EU, however, 
the actual establishment of the panels was deferred until February 1976, but after their 
establishment they were able to work without being bothered by the either dispute party.49 In 
their reports of November 1976 the panels not only criticized the DISC scheme as 
incompatible with US commitments under GATT, but also various tax provisions of the three 
EU states (GATT L/4422).  
 
To avoid the report becoming binding the US announced in December 1976 that it would 
block the panel report criticizing its DISC scheme unless the EU was prepared to accept the 
panel reports criticizing their tax systems. (New York Times 06.11.1976, The Economist 
20.11.1976). However, almost all GATT states were in favour of rejecting the panel report 
criticizing the EU while at the same time supporting the adoption of the panel report criticizing 
the US. While the former was considered to be legally wrong, the latter was held to be legally 
correct. Nevertheless, in the face of an overwhelming majority of GATT Council members the 
Carter administration blocked the adoption of the panel report for more than five years.50  
 
Only in December 1981, after realizing that the blockage of the report had damaged its 
reputation and in this way impeded its struggle against subsidies under GATT, the US was 
finally prepared to follow the agreed dispute settlement procedures (Wall Street Journal 
10.12.1981). The Reagan administration had to acknowledge that when confronted with their 
complaints about subsidies, the accused states could always justify their defiance by pointing 
at the US blockage of the panel report in the DISC case. To overcome the humiliation of 
being so discredited, the Reagan administration finally accepted the Council’s adoption of the 
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four aforementioned reports on the understanding that the European tax systems – but not 
the American tax system – would be rehabilitated as compatible with the GATT (Parent 
1989: 122-123, Hudec 1993: 92).  
 
After the adoption of the panel reports the dispute moved on to the implementation phase. In 
December 1981, the Reagan administration openly refused to comply with the panel report 
that criticized the US (New York Times 22.07.1982). Manipulating the understanding among 
almost all GATT members, the US claimed that the aforementioned GATT Council resolution 
not only rehabilitated the European but also the American tax system.51 In response to this 
attempt to justify US non-compliance, almost all GATT members supported council 
resolutions that shamed the US for its open defiance of an adopted panel report (Financial 
Times 11.05.1982). Moreover, this defiance proved to damage the US reputation anew, and  
considerably impeded the Reagan administration’s struggle against GATT-defiant subsidies 
of other states .52 In July 1982 it therefore announced that it was now willing to follow the 
panel report.53 In 1983, after extensive deliberations between the Reagan administration and 
Congress, the US finally abandoned the DISC scheme, and substituted it with preferential tax 
status for so-called Foreign Sales Corporations, or FSCs. Since FSCs, in contrast to DISCs, 
had to be located abroad – in tax havens like the Virgin Islands – in order to enjoy the said 
preferential tax treatment, they were considered to be compatible with GATT obligations.54 
For the time being, the decade-long DISC dispute came to an end.55  
 
 
The FSC Case 
Although it accepted the US preferential tax treatment of FSCs for more than a decade, the 
EU then complained in 1997 that it was not compatible with WTO law.56 The FSC scheme 
was considered illegal under WTO law because it grants for exports certain exemptions from 
otherwise due tax payments.57 The EU especially criticized that the exemptions were granted 
only for the export of commodities produced in the US, and not for all commodities of the 
respective company regardless of where they were produced.58 The US, however, defended 
the FSC scheme on the grounds that it was merely rebalancing the advantages European 
companies reaped from the European tax systems, which were based on the principle of 
territorial rather than global taxation.59 
 
Throughout the complaints phase the US tried to avoid the invocation of the WTO dispute 
settlement procedure by the EU. Admittedly, it accepted its duty to consultations. In fact, in 
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1997 and 1998 EU and US delegations met three times for consultations.60 To prevent the 
EU from requesting a panel, however, the Clinton administration threatened to retaliate with 
similar demands for panels to deal with the allegedly deviant tax systems of some EU states. 
The US wanted to solve the dispute by negotiation with the EU rather than under the WTO 
dispute settlement system.61 
 
Nevertheless, the EU insisted on a WTO panel. 62  The FSC case moved on to the 
adjudication phase, in which the US strictly followed the designated procedures.63 The US 
and the EU agreed on the composition of a panel, which was then established in November 
1998. The panel report of October 1999 stated that the preferential tax treatment for FSCs 
provided export subsidies that were illegal under WTO law.64 The US appealed, but the 
Appellate Body upheld the main conclusion of the panel and requested the US in its report of 
February 2000 to bring its tax laws in conformity with WTO law.65  
 
The US nevertheless continued to follow the WTO dispute settlement procedures in the 
implementation phase. Though critical of the report, the US declared that it would revise the 
FSC scheme accordingly. 66  In fact, obviously feeling normatively committed to WTO 
procedures, the Clinton administration did not even consider defying the WTO reports, and 
accepted without hesitation that the FSC scheme must be repealed. It explained, however, 
that it had the intention of adjusting US tax law to its WTO obligations in a way that the tax 
burden would not increase for companies that had hitherto enjoyed the advantages of the 
FSC scheme.67 Underlining the (normative) commitment of the US to the WTO procedures, 
Deputy Secretary of Finance Stuart Eizenstaat explained:68  
“In general it is the intention of the US to implement the recommendations and rulings of the 
WTO in a manner that respects our WTO obligations while protecting the interests of US 
companies and workers”.  
 
In fact, in November 2000, under pressure from the Clinton administration,69 US Congress 
replaced the FSC scheme with a so-called Extraterritorial Income (ETI) scheme, which 
provided preferential tax rates for both export and non-export earnings from the foreign 
activities of US companies. 70  However, the EU objected that the ETI scheme failed to 
adequately implement the WTO decision,71 but the US, having repealed its FSC scheme in 
good faith, maintained that the ETI regime complied with its WTO obligations.72 To deal with 
the dispute the WTO panel and the Appellate Body convened again, and concluded in their 
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reports of August 2001, and January 2002 that the ETI scheme violated WTO law.73 The US 
was obliged to revise its tax legislation again.74  
 
As the US could hardly change its ETI legislation immediately, the dispute entered the 
enforcement phase. As compensation for the damage it suffered from the illegal ETI scheme, 
the EU requested that the WTO approve sanctions of approximately 4 billion US Dollars.75 
Nevertheless, the US continued to follow the WTO dispute settlement provisions. Partly due 
to its normative commitment towards WTO dispute settlement provisions, but also due to the 
credible threat of authorized sanctions, the Bush administration consented to ask Congress 
again to revise the US tax legislation.76 Speaking out in favour of a repeal of the ETI scheme, 
the administration emphasized that the US should not undermine the credibility of WTO, 
which generally served American long-term interests, for the sake of short-term objectives.77 
Under the pressure of gradually increasing EU sanctions, the Bush administration vigorously 
tried to push a WTO-compliant solution through Congress.78 This was only deferred over and 
over again because Congress could not agree on how best to repeal the ETI scheme.79 
Eventually, in October 2004, Congress finally adopted a repealed ETI scheme, thus bringing 
the US back into compliance with its WTO obligations and bringing the dispute with the EU to 
an end.80 
 
 
Comparing the DISC and FSC Cases 
Overall, the comparison of US dispute settlement behaviour in the DISC and FSC cases 
backs the institutionalist hypothesis. While switching back and forth between avoiding, 
following and manipulating the diplomatic GATT dispute settlement procedures in the DISC 
case, the US proved to be prepared, after initial attempts to avoid the invocation of the WTO 
had failed, to strictly follow the judicialized WTO dispute settlement system. Moreover, as the 
DISC case shows, the GATT procedures only took effect because the US had learned that 
blocking and disregarding the panel report undermined its reputation, thereby impeding its 
attempts to negotiate for stricter GATT rules on subsidies. In the FSC case, by comparison, 
the WTO procedures also had an impact because, firstly, both the Clinton and the Bush 
administration felt normatively committed to comply with WTO dispute settlement provisions, 
and secondly they were concerned about the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement 
system. Moreover, the threat of sanctions authorized by the WTO obviously contributed to its 
compliance with WTO rulings. 
 
What is more, not only US behaviour differed in both cases, but EU behaviour too, so that 
the way in which the two superpowers of international trade handled the disputes differed 
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considerably. While the DISC case was mainly dealt with outside of the GATT procedures, 
the FSC case was mainly handled within the WTO dispute settlement system.  
 
 
3.2 Comparing the Patents and the Steel Cases 
 
To the extent that in both the Patents and the Steel case the EU accused the US of illegal 
retaliation against allegedly unfair trading practices of their GATT/WTO partners, these cases 
lend themselves well to a pairwise comparison in the context of a most similar case design 
for judging the institutionalist hypothesis.  
 
 
The Patents Case 
The Patents case emerged in 1986 as a result of US provisions that allowed American 
companies suffering from patent infringements on products of non-American origin to invoke 
not only ordinary courts, as was permissible with products of American origin, but also a so-
called International Trade Commission (ITC), which was accountable to the US 
administration. 81  The EU complained that the ITC procedure was illegal under GATT 
because it discriminated against non-American companies that were accused of violating 
American patents.82 The US, however, held that the ITC procedures differed from ordinary 
court procedures, but did not discriminate against non-American companies which allegedly 
violated American patents.83 
 
Faced with the accusations of the EU the US, during the complaints phase, strictly followed 
GATT dispute settlement provisions. The US accepted the EU’s request for formal 
consultations. In fact, the Reagan administration was in favour of consultations because it 
thought that these would further the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations over the protection 
of intellectual property rights which it so strongly supported. The US hoped that by offering to 
repeal the ITC procedures during the negotiations it might get something in return from the 
EU. The EU, however, insisted that the US adjust its ITC procedures not as a result of 
ongoing GATT negotiations, but as a precondition for successful negotiations over 
intellectual property rights.84  
 
As there was obviously no common ground on which the two sides could meet the dispute 
entered the adjudication phase, and in March 1987 the EU requested a GATT panel to 
decide on the legality of the ITC procedure.85 Strictly following GATT dispute settlement 
provisions, the US accepted the request and refrained at this point from obstructing it in the 
GATT Council.86 In line with the EU’s criticism , the panel, which was then established in 
October 1987, concluded that the US provisions unduly discriminated between violations of 
US patents by products of American and non-American origin.87 Its report requested:  
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“the United States to bring its procedures applied in patent infringement cases bearing on 
imported products into conformity with its obligations under the General Agreement”.88  
 
In an effort to avoid the report becoming binding, the US blocked its adoption at eight 
consecutive GATT Council meetings. 89  Like the Reagan administration, the new Bush 
administration hoped that the ITC procedure could be used as a bargaining tool in the 
intellectual property rights negotiations of the GATT Uruguay Round.90 Deputy US Trade 
Representative Rufus Xerxa underlined that only with an effective international procedure in 
place was the US prepared to renounce its ITC procedures and accept the panel report.91 
However, blocking the report turned out to be self-defeating.92 Later, even USTR Clara Hills 
had to admit that the obstruction of the panel report and consequent loss of reputation for the 
US had become a liability rather than a bargaining tool, as intended, for the GATT Uruguay 
Round negotiations on intellectual property rights.93 Indeed, the EU was not alone in shaming 
the US and declaring that US compliance with the panel report was a necessary precondition 
for successful GATT negotiations on intellectual property rights.94 Finally, in November 1989, 
to save these negotiations the US conceded to accept the panel report.95 Former USTR F. 
Holmer explained why his successors were now willing to follow GATT procedures:  
“They never were going to be successful in the Uruguay Round, particularly in the intellectual 
property negotiations, if they continued to block that panel report. It was having a very 
negative impact on the negotiations”.96  
 
Yet, during the implementation phase the US began to openly disregard the GATT dispute 
settlement system.97 The Bush administration declared that any US statute changes would 
have to wait until the GATT Uruguay Round was successfully concluded.98 The US even 
continued to ignore the panel report in the light of further delays in the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round beyond 1990, and in the meantime even refused to apply existing ITC 
provisions in line with GATT provisions.99  This time, attempts to shame the US and to 
undermine its reputation as a reliable GATT partner failed. Only five years later, with the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, was the US finally prepared to adjust its ITC procedures to 
meet its obligations under GATT. The patents case finally came to an end. 
 
 
The Steel Case 
The origins of the Steel case went back to steel tariffs introduced by the US in March 2002 in 
response to a sudden surge of steel imports due to the Asian Crisis in 1997 and 1998, which 
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affected – and continued to affect – the American Steel industry.100 The US considered these 
tariffs to be WTO-compatible, because, according to the Bush administration, they were to 
provide temporary relief from international competition, so that the steel industry could 
undergo a restructuring program.101 The EU, however, criticized the steel tariffs as an open 
violation of WTO law,102 and underlined that steel imports into the US increased after the 
Asian Crisis in 1997 and 1998 only and have declined ever since.103 Therefore, the EU 
argued, the steel tariffs could not be justified under WTO law.104 
 
The complaints phase began in March 2002, immediately after the increase of the tariffs had 
been declared, when the EU invoked the WTO dispute settlement procedure.105 Although it 
was determined to implement the intended tariffs, the US followed the WTO dispute 
settlement provisions and accepted the EU request for consultations, which were held in 
April 2002.106  
 
As the consultations failed, the dispute entered the adjudication phase during which the US 
continued to follow the WTO dispute settlement procedures,107 neither disregarding nor trying 
to manipulate them. While granting exemptions from the steel tariffs for a variety of specific 
steel products, the Bush administration continued to argue in favour the tariffs. Yet the panel, 
which was requested by the EU, in its report of July 2003, as well as the Appellate Body, 
which was invoked by the US, in its report of November 2003, agreed that the American steel 
tariffs were illegal under WTO law. Both reports criticized that among other things, the US 
had failed to demonstrate a causal link between rising steel imports and the crisis of the 
American steel industry, and both reports demanded that the US repeal its illegal steel 
tariffs.108 
 
Although it criticized the reports, the Bush administration announced that the US was willing 
to follow the WTO reports, and to withdraw its steel tariffs, and the implementation phase 
began. 109  While, admittedly, it neither mentioned the WTO reports nor the sanctions 
threatened by the EU, but pointed instead at the successful restructuring of the American 
steel industry,110 it was nevertheless obvious that the administration complied because it 
feared authorized sanctions. It was hardly by chance that it announced its decision, in 
December 2003, less than a week before the EU was able to apply sanctions of about 2.2 
billion US dollars. Within both the administration and Congress the prospect of sanctions 
authorized by the WTO weakened those who had argued in favour of steel tariffs, while 
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strengthening those who had always been against them.111 For example, Senator Lamar 
Alexander from Tennessee declared, in face of the sanctions: 
“Because of the WTO ruling continuing the tariff will destroy thousands more of our textile 
and agricultural jobs. President Bush’s honest effort to save steel jobs is now backfiring and 
hurting American workers”.112  
 
In addition, concerns about US reputation and about the WTO’s credibility had also won the 
administration as well as Congress over in favour of complying with the WTO reports.113 
Senator Charles E. Grassley, for instance, maintained:  
“Although I may not agree with every decision at the WTO, it’s important that we comply 
when decisions go against us. Complying with our WTO obligations is an important sign of 
American leadership”.114 
 
 
Comparing the Patent and Steel Cases 
Overall, the comparison of US dispute settlement behaviour in the Patents and the Steel 
case supports the institutionalist hypothesis. While in the Steel case it strictly followed the 
judicial WTO procedures, in the Patent case its strategy fluctuated between following, 
avoiding and disregarding the diplomatic GATT dispute settlement mechanism. Moreover, as 
the Patent case confirms, the GATT procedures only had an impact on the US when its 
deviant behaviour discredited its reputation to such a degree that it jeopardized its efforts to 
negotiate over intellectual property rights protection within the GATT Uruguay Round 
negotiations. The Steel case shows us that the WTO procedures also had an impact 
because the Bush administration as well as Congress feared authorized sanctions and they 
held concerns about the US reputation and the credibility of the WTO. 
 
In addition, not only the US but also the EU acted differently in the Patent and the Steel case. 
The way in which the two disputants dealt with these cases thus differed considerably. While 
the Patent case, after a good start, was then mainly dealt with and finally solved outside of 
GATT dispute settlement procedures, the Steel case was settled entirely within the WTO 
dispute settlement system. Both parties to the dispute evidently likened GATT panel reports 
to political bargaining chips, while they accepted that the WTO reports have to be treated as 
binding rulings.  
 
 
3.3 Comparing the Hormones Cases 
 
The so-called Hormones cases under GATT and WTO are singularly appropriate for 
investigating the institutionalist hypothesis within a most similar case design. The cases are 
similar because in both of them the US objected to the EU ban on beef treated with certain 
growth hormones. Moreover, in both cases the US had considerable incentives to take the 
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law into its own hands, because the EU refused to lift its ban although it defied GATT/WTO 
regulations. 
 
 
The First Hormones Case 
When the Hormones case was sparked off in 1985 the EU claimed that its ban was justified 
because the growth hormones in question were suspected of enhancing the risk of cancer. 
The US, however, criticized the ban as illegal under GATT because there was no evidence, 
they claimed, that meat produced with the said hormones increased the risk of cancer.115 The 
US complained that the ban was an arbitrary measure to protect European beef producers 
from American meat production.116 
 
From early on in the complaints phase the US disregarded the GATT dispute settlement 
mechanism.117 Then in March 1987 the US requested consultations with the EU under the 
GATT agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.118 Even before consultations took place, 
however, and without any GATT authorization, the US threatened to employ sanctions if the 
EU went ahead with its ban.119 In fact, under heavy pressure from Congress the Reagan 
administration even prepared a list of EU products the US was willing to sanction.120  
 
At all events the GATT consultations failed, and in June 1987 the Hormones case entered 
the adjudication phase. The US now requested a dispute settlement panel to be established 
under the TBT agreement rather than GATT, because the former provided panels of 
independent experts, while the latter appointed panels of state representatives.121 The EU 
was not prepared to accept a panel of experts, however; from the European point of view the 
TBT agreement was not applicable to the Hormones case.122 Yet, the EU did offer to accept 
a GATT panel to decide on the applicability of the TBT agreement.123 Although this was 
explicitly provided under the TBT agreement, the US rejected the GATT panel and insisted 
instead on an expert panel under the TBT agreement. 124  In September 1987, in open 
disregard of GATT dispute settlement procedures, the Reagan administration thus began 
preparing concrete sanctions.125  
 
The Hormones dispute now moved on to the implementation phase. Finally, in December 
1987, in disregard of the GATT dispute settlement system, the Reagan administration 
decided to employ sanctions.126 It prepared a list of products against which sanctions were to 
be employed if and when the EU ban went into force.127 As attempts to come to an amicable 
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solution repeated failed, the dispute threatened to escalate.128 The EU announced that it was 
prepared to retaliate against US sanctions, to which the Reagan administration threatened 
with counter-retaliation.129 
 
The Hormones case entered the enforcement phase when the EU ban went into force in 
January 1989. Still disregarding GATT provisions the US immediately responded with 
unauthorized sanctions.130 Moreover, the US blocked the EU request for a GATT panel to 
deal with American sanctions.131 The US claimed that non-authorized sanctions were justified 
because of the inadequate dispute settlement procedures under GATT, which in their view 
gave the EU the opportunity to arbitrarily block its request for a panel.132 In actual fact, the 
US had never requested a GATT panel. 133  In any case, US sanctions that defied the 
regulations of the GATT were not conducive to an amicable solution of the dispute.134 The 
US and the EU merely managed to agree on partial solutions which led to a gradual 
reduction of US sanctions.135 
 
 
The Second Hormones Case 
In 1995, with the new dispute settlement procedures in place, the US again started to 
complain about the EU ban on hormones-treated beef. This time, however, from early on in 
the complaints phase, the US was prepared to strictly follow the WTO dispute settlement 
procedure. In contrast to the earlier Hormones case under GATT, the US refrained from 
threats of imposing non-authorized sanctions. Instead, it announced that it would invoke the 
WTO dispute settlement procedures if the EU did not give up its illegal ban immediately. In 
fact, in January 1996, after attempts to come to an amicable solution with the EU again 
failed, the US requested consultations under the WTO.136  
 
After the failure of WTO consultations the dispute entered the adjudication phase.137 In April 
1996 the US, still following the dispute settlement procedures to the letter, requested the 
establishment of a WTO panel.138 The Clinton administration even withdrew the sanctions the 
US had been employing since the first Hormones dispute.139 The administration underlined 
that it was seeking to get sanctions authorized by the WTO in order to force the EU to give 
up its ban which it claimed infringed WTO law. USTR Charlene Barshefsky even declared 
that she considered authorized sanctions as the only effective means of asserting US rights 
in the face of EU non-compliance.140 To ensure that the EU could not turn the tables she 
even decided that the US would give up on its previous sanctions. She explained:  
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“As the United States now had effective multilateral procedures to address the matter of the 
EC’s restrictions on imports of U.S. meat (…) the USTR (…) determined that it was in the 
interest of the United States to terminate (…) the increased duties”.141  
 
In their reports of August 1997 and February 1998 the panel as well as the Appellate Body 
agreed that the ban was illegal, because the EU had failed to provide scientific evidence that 
beef treated with the hormones in question posed any risk for consumers.142 And USTR 
Charlene Barshefsky claimed victory:  
“This is a sign that the WTO dispute settlement system can handle complex and difficult 
disputes where a WTO member attempts to justify trade barriers by thinly disguising them as 
health measures”.143 
 
The Hormones dispute now entered the implementation phase. Disagreement arose again 
over the period for the implementation of the WTO reports. The US insisted that the EU end 
its ban immediately.144 The EU however, argued that the WTO reports had not criticized the 
ban itself, but merely the lack of scientific evidence. The EU demanded the right to uphold its 
ban for 15 months while seeking scientific evidence to justify the ban.145 In fact, a panel, 
invoked by the US, gave the EU 15 months until May 1999 to come into compliance with the 
WTO reports.146 Unlike the first Hormones case under GATT, the US continued to follow the 
WTO procedures despite this decision. It did not resort to unilateral sanctions the very 
moment that WTO procedures did not bring forth the desired results. The fact that the 
administration as well as Congress did not even consider unilateral sanctions might even be 
seen as an indication of their normative commitment towards the WTO procedures.147 
 
As the EU decided in May 1999 that it would uphold its ban on hormones-treated beef, the 
dispute with the US entered the enforcement phase. The EU argued that scientific evidence 
was in preparation which indicated that the said hormones posed a risk for human 
consumption.148 The US, however, accusing the EU of undermining the credibility of the 
WTO system, was no longer willing to wait for the EU to produce sound scientific 
evidence.149 May 1999, in accordance with the dispute settlement provisions, the Clinton 
administration requested the WTO to authorize sanctions.150 This was, however, deferred 
when the EU requested a further WTO panel to decide on the amount of sanctions.151 Again, 
the US assented, and when the decision was made was even prepared to reduce sanctions, 
as required, from 220 to 116 million US dollars.152 The US was anxious to ensure that the EU 
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could not turn the tables and shame it for violating WTO procedures.153 Moreover, the US 
urged the EU to comply with the reports to preserve the WTO’s credibility.154  The EU, 
however, merely accepted the sanctions employed by the US without retaliation, but until 
today has neither lifted the ban nor provided scientific evidence for its justification.155  
 
 
Comparing the Hormones Cases 
The comparison of US behaviour in the two Hormones cases under GATT and WTO bears 
out the institutionalist hypothesis. While constantly disregarding the diplomatic GATT dispute 
settlement procedures during the first case, the US was willing to follow the judicial WTO 
dispute settlement provisions to the letter in the second case. As the first Hormones case 
reveals, the GATT dispute settlement proceedings had hardly any effect on US behaviour. 
The very moment that the procedure did not deliver the desired results, because the EU 
refused the required TBT panel, the US decided to take the law into its own hands. In the 
second Hormones case, by contrast, the US was prepared to strictly follow the WTO 
procedures although it also did not bring forth the desired results. In particular, the dispute 
settlement proceedings did not authorize the amount of sanctions requested by the US, and 
(therefore) failed to ensure EU compliance with the panel report requiring the EU to lift its 
ban. The US was obviously prepared to follow the WTO procedure because it perceived it to 
allow effective shaming of the EU and to get sanctions authorized. At the same time it 
followed the procedures to rule out that the EU could shame the US for disregarding its WTO 
obligations and to ask the WTO itself for authorized sanctions. In addition, normative 
commitments towards the WTO seemed to have had an impact on US behaviour too. 
 
Moreover, in the Hormones cases not only the US, but also the EU acted more in 
accordance with the dispute settlement procedures under the WTO than under GATT. 
Certainly, in both cases the EU upheld its ban on hormone-treated beef in defiance of the 
respective rulings. Remarkably, however, in the second Hormones case the EU accepted the 
sanctions the US was authorized to employ without any threat of retaliation. Therefore the 
way in which the two superpowers of international trade dealt with the dispute changed 
considerably. While in the first case, under GATT, their behaviour threatened to lead to a 
spiral of unauthorized sanctions, retaliation and counter-retaliation, the second case could be 
kept within the frame of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
 
 
3.4 Comparing the Citrus and Bananas Cases 
 
In terms of case similarity the so-called Citrus case under GATT and the Bananas case 
under the WTO fulfil the criteria for evaluating the institutionalist hypothesis, because both 
are similar inasmuch as the US complained that the EU’s preferential treatment of 
agricultural products from former European colonies discriminated against products from the 
US.  
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The Citrus Case 
Since the 1960s, the EU (then the EC) held trade agreements with states around the 
Mediterranean rim giving them preferential access to European markets for a variety of 
products.156 In 1976, the US, although in principle accepting the preferential treatment of 
developing countries, criticized specifically the agreements for Citrus products. The US 
claimed that these agreements were illegal under GATT because they unduly discriminated 
against American Citrus products. The EU, which saw the US allegations as an attempt to 
undermine its trade agreements with Mediterranean countries, argued that the preferences 
for Citrus from these countries were compatible with GATT, which explicitly allows 
preferential treatment for developing countries.  
 
During the early complaints phase the US avoided dealing with the dispute under the GATT 
dispute settlement procedures. As encouraged by the GATT agreement, it tried to reach a 
negotiated settlement with the EU, first between 1976 and 1978 outside of GATT, then 
between 1979 and 1982 in the context of the GATT Tokyo Round. Only in June 1982, after 
these attempts failed, did it invoke GATT dispute settlement procedures. Now following the 
dispute settlement provisions, the US requested formal consultations. 157  Consultations 
followed, but the US and the EU were unable to find a solution for the Citrus case.158 
 
The dispute thus entered the adjudication phase, and the US requested the appointment of a 
GATT dispute settlement panel. 159  The Reagan administration followed GATT dispute 
settlement provisions although attempts by the EU to block the establishment of a panel 
delayed the commencement of their work until October 1983.160 In its report of December 
1984 the panel concluded that the preferential treatment of Citrus products from developing 
countries – while not a violation of GATT obligations – nullified privileges the EU had already 
granted to the US.161 Hence the panel neither concurred with the US that the preferential 
treatment itself was a violation of GATT, nor did it accept the EU argument that the 
preferential treatment was entirely compatible with the provisions of the GATT. The EU was 
merely requested to reduce tariffs for two Citrus products, i.e. oranges and lemons. 162 
Although the US had not accomplished what it had desired, the administration supported the 
approval of the panel report.163 The EU, by contrast, blocked its adoption by the GATT 
Council.164 
 
The dispute proceeded to the implementation phase, in the course of which the US 
administration declared that it now considered the dispute settlement process under GATT to 
be terminated.165 Due to the EU’s obstruction of the panel report and its refusal to comply 
with the panel’s recommendations, the US claimed the right to employ sanctions without 
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GATT approval. 166  Disregarding GATT dispute settlement provisions, the US indeed 
prepared a list of sanctions it was willing to employ.167 The EU however warned that it would 
retaliate against non-authorized US sanctions immediately.168  
 
Now entering the enforcement phase, however, the US continued to disregard the GATT 
dispute settlement provisions. Without obtaining GATT approval it increased tariffs for 
European pasta by 25-40%.169 The Reagan administration claimed that this was justified 
because the GATT dispute settlement system was unreliable.170 However, these unilateral 
sanctions aggravated the dispute, because the EU retaliated, again without GATT approval, 
by increasing tariffs on American citrus and walnuts by 20% and 30% respectively.171 The 
European Commission considered its retaliatory sanctions justified because of the US’ 
disrespect for the GATT ban on non-authorized sanctions.172 
 
To prevent the dispute from escalating further – both parties were meanwhile threatening to 
retaliate against the other party’s retaliation – the US and the EU tried to reach a negotiated 
settlement. In June 1985 they agreed on a “ceasefire” to temporarily give up their sanctions 
against European pasta and American citrus and walnuts.173 But when the ceasefire ended in 
October 1985, both parties reinstateded their sanctions.174 During the summer of 1986 the 
dispute seemed to be getting out of control, with both the US and the EU threatening to step 
up their retaliatory measures.175 Only the prospect that the Citrus dispute might hamper the 
GATT Uruguay Round negotiations brought the US and the EU back to the negotiation 
table.176 In August 1986, after tough negotiations, they finally agreed that the EU had to 
reduce its tariffs on citrus, while the US accepted its preferential treatment of Mediterranean 
countries.177 After more than ten years the citrus dispute was finally over.178 
 
 
The Bananas Case 
The EU Bananas Directive of 1993, which provided preferential access to European markets 
for bananas from certain developing countries, especially from the Caribbean, gave rise to 
the Bananas dispute with the US.179 The US complained that the Bananas regime was not 
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compatible with WTO law because it not only provided preferential treatment to developing 
countries, but also privileged European marketing companies which mainly traded with 
bananas from the Caribbean, and discriminated against American companies – such as 
Chiquita and Dole – that marketed bananas from Latin America.180 The EU argued however 
that its bananas regime was compatible with WTO law because it was merely designed to 
privilege bananas from Caribbean countries without giving any advantage to European 
marketing companies over their American competitors.181 
 
Early on in the complaints phase, to avoid a formal WTO dispute settlement procedure the 
US tried to persuade the EU to modify its projected bananas regime before it even came into 
force. But since the bananas regime had been highly contested within the EU, it was unable 
to agree on a modified regime that would satisfy US interests. In September 1995, in a move 
to force the EU to give in, the US administration, following WTO dispute settlement 
procedures, requested formal consultations with the EU. 182  As USTR Micky Kantor 
explained, fear of being put to shame and losing its reputation prevented the US from 
threatening to apply unauthorized sanctions: 
“If we had gone with unilateral sanctions, all we would have done was raise the ire of all the 
other WTO members, including the member states in the EU who favoured our position”.183 
 
Since the US and the EU failed to solve the bananas dispute through consultations, however, 
the dispute then entered the adjudication phase.184 Consistently following WTO procedures, 
the US asked for a panel to decide on the EU bananas regime.185 The panel as well as the 
Appellate Body concluded in their reports of May 1997 and September 1997 respectively that 
the EU bananas regime was not compatible with WTO law.186 The reports accepted the 
preferential treatment of bananas from Caribbean countries, but criticized the fact that the EU 
import quotas and import licences unduly discriminated against American and in favour of 
European marketing companies.187  
 
In the implementation phase, still following WTO procedures, the Clinton administration 
accepted a WTO panel decision allowing the EU not only until August 1998, as demanded by 
the US, but until January 1999 to adjust its banana regime.188 The EU declared that it was 
willing to repeal its bananas regime by then.189 When, however, in July 1998 it became clear 
that the EU would only agree on cosmetic changes to its bananas regime, the US began to 
manipulate the WTO procedure. If the EU did not come up with a substantively revised 
bananas regime, the Clinton administration threatened, the US would request sanctions 
without involving another WTO panel to decide on the legality of the modified bananas 
regime.190 Admittedly, the WTO dispute settlement provisions did not explicitly require the US 
to invoke another panel to decide on the modified regime; implicitly, though, it was obvious 
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that it was not for the US to decide whether the modified regime complied with WTO law. It 
had to invoke another WTO panel to decide on the EU bananas regime before requiring 
sanctions which the WTO was bound to approve.191 
 
In March 1999, now entering the enforcement phase, the Clinton administration imposed 
non-authorized sanctions of 520 m. US dollars against the EU.192 However, it did not actually 
collect these sanctions, but merely required importers to post bonds which would cover the 
sanctions if authorized by the WTO; in this way manipulating rather than disregarding the 
WTO procedures.193 Through these bonds, the US wanted to reserve the right to collect 
sanctions retroactively.194 Its reluctance to openly disregard the dispute settlement provisions 
can be seen as an indication of its normative commitment to the WTO procedures. At all 
events, when a WTO panel finally concluded in April 1999 that the modified EU bananas 
regime still failed to comply with earlier WTO reports, the US reverted to following the WTO 
procedures.195 Although the panel merely authorized sanctions amounting to 191 m. US 
dollars, rather than 520 m. US dollars as it had demanded, the US was prepared to reduce 
its sanctions accordingly.196 Moreover, the US also complied with a further panel report 
stipulating that it may not employ sanctions retroactively, and refrained from using the posted 
bonds.197 Nevertheless, even with authorized sanctions in place it took another two years 
before the EU and the US could agree on a WTO-compliant regime for the importation of 
bananas. 
 
 
Comparing the Citrus and Bananas Cases 
Overall, the comparison of US behaviour in the Citrus case under GATT and the bananas 
case under the WTO sustains the institutionalist hypothesis. Admittedly, in both cases, the 
US was only prepared to follow the agreed GATT/WTO procedures after attempting to avoid 
a formal dispute settlement procedure. However, later on in Bananas dispute the US 
abstained from openly disregarding WTO procedures, while it clearly violated GATT 
provisions in the Citrus case. While in the citrus case the GATT dispute settlement 
procedures hardly had any effect on US behaviour, the WTO dispute settlement procedures 
in the bananas case had at least some impact. As in the second Hormones case, the US 
was willing to go by the WTO procedure in the Bananas case because it perceived it as an 
effective instrument for shaming the EU and getting sanctions authorized. Moreover, it 
refrained from openly disregarding procedures, even when they did not deliver the desired 
results, in order to avoid being put to shame by the EU for disregarding its WTO obligations, 
and to pre-empt European sanctions authorized by the WTO. In addition, the normative 
commitment toward the WTO also seems to have played a substantial role. 
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Furthermore, not only the US, but also the EU acted more in accordance with the WTO 
dispute settlement procedures in the Bananas case than in the Citrus case under GATT. 
Admittedly, the EU manipulated and disregarded both GATT and WTO procedures. But in 
the Bananas case, in contrast to the Citrus case, it did not dare to retaliate against US 
sanctions. The fact that US sanctions were authorized forbade the EU to employ any 
retaliatory measures. Therefore, the way in which the US and the EU were able to handle the 
dispute differed considerably. While the Citrus case – like the Hormones case under GATT – 
threatened to escalate into an exchange of sanctions, retaliation and counter-retaliation, the 
Bananas case – like the Hormones case under the WTO – was largely contained within the 
WTO dispute settlement system. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 
The institutionalist hypothesis is thus clearly underpinned by the pairwise comparisons 
described above. In each pair of cases the US acted – no matter whether as complainant or 
as defendant – more in accordance with the judicial WTO dispute settlement procedures 
than with the diplomatic GATT procedures. US behaviour in the FSC case was more 
compliant than in the DISC case, more conforming in the Steel than in the Patents case; 
more in compliance in the second than in the first Hormones case, and more conforming in 
the Bananas than in the Citrus case.  
 
 
Table 2: US Behaviour in Disputes with the EU 
 
 Complaints Adjudication Implementation Enforcement 
DISC 
(GATT) 
Avoiding Following 
Avoiding 
Manipulating 
Following 
NA 
FSC (WTO) Avoiding Following Following Following 
Patents 
(GATT) 
Following Following 
Avoiding 
Disregarding 
Following 
NA 
Steel 
(WTO) 
Following Following Following NA 
Hormones 
(GATT) 
Disregarding Disregarding Disregarding Disregarding 
Hormones 
(WTO) 
Following Following Following Following 
Citrus 
(GATT) 
Avoiding 
Following 
Following Disregarding Disregarding 
Bananas 
(WTO) 
Avoiding 
Following 
Following Following 
Manipulating 
Manipulating 
Following 
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The institutionalist hypothesis even fares well in a comparison of all the eight disputes. While 
the US openly disregarded the relevant procedures – at least temporarily – in all but one of 
the four GATT cases, it did not do so in a single one out of the four WTO cases. And while in 
two of the four WTO cases the US strictly followed the procedures throughout the whole 
dispute, it did not do so once out of the four GATT cases. Remarkably, in each of the four 
WTO cases the US behaved more compliantly than in any single GATT case. When the 
cases are ranked according to the degree to which US behaviour conformed to the relevant 
procedures the first three positions are clearly taken by WTO cases, i.e. the Steel, the 
second Hormones, and the FSC case. The next two positions are then held by the “worst” (in 
terms of compliance) WTO and the “best” GATT cases, i.e. the Bananas and the DISC 
cases. And the last three positions are occupied by GATT cases, namely the Patents, the 
Citrus and the first Hormones cases. 
 
Moreover, the eight cases also seem to support the institutionalist assumption that the 
judicialization of procedures activates the effects specified above that international dispute 
settlement procedures might have. The cases demonstrate that where the GATT dispute 
settlement procedures were at all effective, this could be attributed to one effect, namely that 
of shaming and the potential loss of reputation. This was most obvious in the DISC and the 
Patents case, when the US, after a long history of disregarding, avoiding and manipulating 
the procedures, started to follow procedures to avoid shaming. The WTO dispute settlement 
procedure, by contrast, could not only rely on shaming, but also on states’ normative 
commitments, their concerns about the credibility of the WTO, and on authorized sanctions. 
In each of the four WTO cases the role of these effects – albeit to varying degrees – could be 
illustrated. 
 
The institutionalist hypothesis is also strengthened by the fact that not only the US, but also 
the EU was more compliant under the WTO than under GATT. Certainly, in the WTO cases 
the EU was less compliant than the US. In the Hormones and in the Bananas case at least, 
though not in the FSC and the Steel case, the EU openly disregarded the WTO procedures. 
However, in a comparison between EU behaviour under GATT and under the WTO one can 
still maintain that it is more compliant under the judicialized WTO procedures than it was 
under the diplomatic GATT mechanisms. Most importantly, the dispute settlement practices 
between the EU and the US have certainly changed. As the cases show, the risk of an 
escalation of unauthorized sanctions, retaliation and counter-retaliation that characterized 
dispute settlement under GATT, has been substantially mitigated by the WTO procedures. 
 
To be sure, this is not to argue that the judicialization of GATT/WTO dispute settlement 
procedures offers the best explanation for the judizialization of US dispute settlement 
behaviour. There may be better explanations for this! This is only to argue that the 
judizialization of GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures contributed to the shift in US 
dispute settlement behaviour. To do so, however, I have to demonstrate that explanations 
that do not include the judicialization of GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures fail to 
come to terms with this shift in US behaviour. Three alternative explanations seem to be of 
particular relevance: distribution of power, level of interdependence, US presidents’ belief 
systems.198 
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(1) One alternative explanation might be a shift in the power distribution between the US and 
the EU. Taking the ratio of their respective GDPs as indication for the distribution of power 
between the US and the EU with respect to trade, however, this explanation does not fare 
particularly well. While US behaviour in its disputes with the EU was more in compliance with 
the dispute settlement procedures under WTO than under the old GATT system the 
distribution of power between the US and the EU has hardly changed. With minor 
fluctuations the ratio of their GDPs stayed almost constant with the GDP of the EU being 
around 10 per cent higher than the GDP of the US. 
 
 
Gross Domestic Product (in billions of US dollars; fixed exchange rates of 1995) 
 
 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
USA 3969 4772 5563 6521 7338 8987 
EU 4548 5300 5849 7424 8613 9802 
US/EU 0,87 0,90 0,95 0,87 0,85 0,91 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 
 
 
(2) Another alternative explanation could be the level of interdependence between the US 
and the EU. Higher levels of economic interdependence might lead to higher levels of 
compliance with GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures. In fact, using US foreign trade 
quotas as indicator, levels of interdependence have, with some fluctuations, increased from 
around 16 per cent in the mid-1970s to around 25 per cent in the mid-2000s. However, this 
more or less constant increase does not match the sudden change of US dispute settlement 
behaviour in the mid-1990s. Moreover, it does not match US levels of compliance under the 
GATT and WTO dispute settlement systems respectively. Notwithstanding growing levels of 
interdependence US behaviour in early GATT disputes such as the DISC case was more 
compliant than in later GATT disputes such as the first Hormones case; and it was more 
compliant in early WTO disputes such as the second Hormones case than in later WTO 
disputes such as the Bananas or the FSC cases. 
 
 
US Foreign Trade (in billions of US dollars) 
 
 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Export 149 280 302 552 812 1096 1175 
Import 151 293 417 630 903 1475 1781 
BIP 1825 2789 4220 5803 7397 9817 11735 
FT-Quota 16% 20% 17% 20% 23% 26% 25% 
Source: US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division 
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(3) Fundamental foreign policy beliefs of the respective US presidents could provide another 
alternative explanation for changes of US dispute settlement behaviour under GATT and 
WTO. US presidents with belief systems of a multilateralist might be more willing to settle 
disputes with the EU according to the relevant GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures 
than US presidents with belief systems of a unilateralist. Taking Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, 
Ronald Reagan and George Bush jun. as unilateralists while assuming that Jimmie Carter, 
George Bush sen. and Bill Clinton can be considered multilateralists this seems to explain 
differences in US behaviour under GATT and WTO respectively: 21 dispute years of the 
selected GATT disputes fall under unilateralist presidents (mainly Reagan) and only 17 
dispute years under multilateralist presidents; under the WTO by contrast only 4 dispute 
years fall under unilateralist presidencies whereas 16 dispute years fall under multilateralist 
presidencies (mainly Clinton). However, US presidents’ belief systems can hardly explain all 
the differences in US behaviour under GATT and the WTO. Most remarkably, under George 
Bush jun. presidency the US behaved in the Bananas, Steel and FSC disputes more 
compliant with WTO procedures than during Jimmie Carter’s presidency when the US 
disregarded GATT procedures in both the Citrus and the DISC cases. 
 
 
US Presidents’ Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 
1973-
1977 
1977-
1981 
1981-
1985 
1985-
1989 
1989-
1993 
1993-
1997 
1997-
2001 
2001-
2005 
Nixon/ 
Ford 
Carter Reagan Reagan Bush sen. Clinton Clinton Bush jun. 
Unilateral Multi-
lateral 
Unilateral Unilateral Multi-
lateral 
Multi-
lateral 
Multi-
lateral 
Unilateral 
 
 
Overall, as alternative explanations of US/EU dispute settlement behaviour fail, the eight 
GATT/WTO disputes underpin the hypothesis that the judicialization of international dispute 
settlement procedures sustains the judicialization of states’ dispute settlement behaviour. 
This, of course, does not prove that the rule of law has already emerged within the WTO. 
The fact that the US and especially the EU did not always follow WTO procedures to settle 
their dispute serves as a reminder of this. But one can claim that not only the procedures, but 
also the corresponding practices of dispute settlement are judicialized to a greater degree 
today under the WTO than under the old GATT. One can also claim that in the context of the 
GATT/WTO an international rule of law is gradually emerging. Hence, contrary to realist 
theory, an international rule of law indeed seems to be possible, at least in the GATT/WTO 
regime. However, unlike early idealism, we should be cautious in seeing this as indication 
that international law can be established beyond the GATT/WTO regime.  
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